We investigate the existence of an 'electoral cycle bias' in the timing of media coverage of news with high political value. In particular, we analyze how the electoral cycles at the regional level influence the coverage of news about corruption scandals in the Italian Regional Health Systems by two important national newspapers having opposite ideology, La Repubblica (left-wing oriented) and Il Giornale (right-wing oriented).
Introduction
Do media faithfully report misconduct of elected officials? Or do they silence political scandals? As watchdogs of political institutions, the role of media is certainly crucial for the proper working of a democracy. But, in recent years, the growing importance of media in everyday life has gone hand in hand with a decline in political involvement and participation by citizens, a 'media-democracy paradox' which has been originated also by the changing role of the media system (McChesney, 2015) . Increasingly powerful commercial media firms may be not dedicated exclusively to watchdog journalism in their coverage of politically relevant news for different reasons (Entman, 2012; Gratton et al., 2017) . First, since profits are positively influenced by the number of readers or viewers, supply of news could be driven by users' preferences, leading media to cover more easyto-consume news to the detriment of information more important for the accountability of the political system but less attractive for the public (Ho and Liu, 2015; Sen and Yildirim, 2015) . However, media outlets could have their own ideological stance, which implies a bias in the supply of political news affecting the selection of both the topic to be covered and how it is presented and discussed (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Shapiro, 2010).
In this paper we are interested in understanding whether media try to affect voters' opinions when these matter most, much like incumbent politicians try to do increasing for instance more visible categories of public spending when elections get closer. In particular, we study if, and how, the coverage of politically relevant news by media outlets varies with respect to the electoral cycle, a dimension of media bias so far left unexplored by the literature.
To identify this 'electoral cycle bias' in politically relevant news, we build a new original database containing all the articles about corruption scandals related to public health care in the Italian regions published during the period 2002-2014. We consider news about corruption in public health care since these are the most salient for voters in regional elections, as long as health spending is by far the most important item in regional budgets in Italy (about 75% of total spending). As for media, we focus on the behavior of two of the most important Italian newspapers, La Repubblica and Il Giornale, and we analyze how the production of articles about corruption varies according to the regional electoral cycles, the newspaper's ideology, and their interaction. We choose La Repubblica and Il Giornale since, among the Italian national newspapers, they are -in a slightly different mannerboth those with a clear political stance and those with the highest diffusion among the individuals sharing the same political view, which makes them the reference newspapers for the median left-wing and right-wing voter respectively.
There are at least two reasons of why the coverage of these politically salient news by media may change with the electoral cycle. On the one hand, since the informational value of corruption news for readers is likely to be higher before than after the elections, when voters are assessing new candidates and the performance of incumbents, the demand for politically relevant news will also be higher in pre-election period (a demand-side effect).
On the other hand, however, since the media has its own ideological stance, the supply of political news may be affected also by this bias, especially if the content of the news may have important political consequences (a supply-side effect).
The analysis of how the coverage of news about corruption scandals varies with respect to electoral cycles represents an ideal setting for testing the interaction between demandand supply-side effects. Our findings -which are robust with respect to different model specifications, the potential endogeneity of some elections, and to different measures of the time to the elections -suggest the presence of a 'partisan electoral cycle' only for Il Giornale. In particular, Il Giornale produces significantly more articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians in election times than in other periods (about 38% of its standard deviation in the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption), and at the same time it reduces the coverage of those involving right-wing politicians (about 55% of its standard deviation for this type of episodes), or those involving any political party (around 150% of its standard deviation for this type of episodes). On the contrary, even if it seems to report about corruption episodes more than Il Giornale, the coverage of corruption scandals by La Repubblica does not appear to be significantly affected neither by the electoral cycle, nor by its ideology. We argue that these differences between the two newspapers are mainly due to the different number of readers and the different degree of 3 ideological polarization of these readers. Furthermore, while we can only provide anecdotal evidence on the political consequences of newspapers' behavior, we believe our findings can help shed additional light on recently discovered 'corruption cycles' (Sidorkin and Vorobyev, 2017 ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the relevant literature, Section 2 presents our new dataset with some descriptives, whereas in Section 3 we describe the empirical strategy. In Section 4 we discuss the results and in Section 5 we check their robustness. Finally, Section 6 provides some final remarks.
Literature review
As the theoretical literature on political budget cycles suggests, incumbent politicians try to influence voters' behavior in different ways as the elections gets nearer. 1 First, to increase their chances of being reelected, they might reduce unemployment in pre-election years as in the original contribution by Nordhaus (1975) ; second, they might pursue an expansionary budgetary policy to signal their competence to voters before elections as in Rogoff and Sibert (1988) , Rogoff (1990) and Shi and Svensson (2006) ; or they might decide to target pivotal groups of voters by increasing specific categories of spending (e.g. Drazen and Eslava (2010), Potrafke (2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2013) ). Empirical evidence on these arguments -surveyed, e.g., in De Haan (2013) -indicates that political budget cycles are more likely to occur in younger than in more mature democracies, even though the mechanism driving the result is far from clear: some authors, for instance, hint at the role of media in providing correct information to the electorate (e.g. Brender and Drazen (2006) and Shi and Svensson (2006) ). Additionally, whether these strategies bring real benefits to incumbent politicians is still an under-researched area, and the evidence is mixed (De Haan, 2013) .
While public spending and deficit are considered as variables that should positively affect voters' opinions about incumbent politicians, similar arguments could be made in relation 1 For a comprehensive survey on opportunistic and partisan budget cycles, see, e.g. Dubois (2016) 4 to variables that are evaluated negatively by voters. For instance, in countries where corruption is common practice, abstaining from bribes before elections could also be a strategy available to elected officials to gain more votes. This argument should give rise to corruption cycles in countries where politicians are elected, 2 but this would be true only if corruption is detected and made public as soon as an official receives bribes. However, corruption is unobservable, people have perceptions about the level of corruption in public life, and perceptions are driven also by the media coverage reporting about corruption episodes.
As discussed in the Introduction, also media are strategic players in this game, and they should take into account users' preferences on the one hand, but also have their own ideology on the other hand (especially if media owners are the politicians themselves).
The existence of a bias in media reporting is investigated by a recent strand of literature in political economy. 3 This bias might be related to the several dimensions on which newspapers can operate an ideological selection: the issue to be covered (Duggan and On the demand-side, since media outlets are profit maximizing agents, they might bias the news coverage in order to attract as many readers as possible to increase their revenues. This is especially true in a context in which readers are affected by cognitive biases. For instance, the presence of a confirmation bias -affecting the way in which individuals generally elaborate information -might lead the media to select both the news to be published (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) and its own sources of information (Sobbrio, 2014a ). However, also in the presence of a perfectly rational audience, the incentives to bias could originate both from a reputational game among media outlets to attract more readers (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006) , or from the limitations of the communication technology offered by newspapers (Chan and Suen, 2008 ).
The empirical literature on this topic, mainly on the US, suggests the importance of both the demand-and the supply-side of the market for news, depending on the dimension of the bias and the way in which this is measured. For instance, findings by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) show that newspapers biasing their own vocabulary towards the rightwing do circulate more within areas recording a higher presence of Republican voters, thus providing a strong positive evidence in favor of the demand-side story. Instead, Puglisi and Snyder (2011) provide a more heterogeneous picture, finding that actually the supply-side story plays a crucial role in determining the bias in the coverage of political scandals by US newspapers. In particular, newspapers more likely to endorse the Democratic party at the elections give more coverage of scandals involving Republicans, while the reverse is true for Republican-leaning newspapers. However, newspapers follow readers' specific preferences in the coverage of local scandals, regardless of their own political position, signaling a definitively more important role for the demand-side story in this case.
In this paper we contribute to this literature on media bias by providing a first analysis of a new dimension on which the ideological bias in the coverage of news by media can take place, that is the timing of coverage. We also provide additional evidence of an important element for the political budget cycle literature, as media reporting of what politicians actually do is likely to affect voters' perceptions even with respect to variables like public spending and deficit. 6 
Media coverage of corruption scandals in the Italian NHS
In order to test the existence of an 'electoral cycle bias' in the media coverage of news about corruption scandals, we focus on episodes concerning the Italian regions and related to the National Health System (NHS) published during the period 2002-2014. The main reason for this choice is the importance for voters in regional elections of news concerning corruption practices in their Regional Health System. Indeed, according to Constitutional rules, the Italian NHS is a regional system that assign to regions the ultimate responsibility of managing (and partly funding) health care services, and health care spending represents by far the largest share in regional expenditures (Turati, 2013) . While differences in per capita spending are mitigated by an allocation formula accounting for needs, with central government redistributing resources toward less fiscally autonomous regions, there is a large variability across regions in terms of both inefficient and inappropriate spending (Francese et al., 2014; Piacenza and Turati, 2014) . Corruption is part of the inefficient spending, but is definitely less well known and studied.
Here we consider an original database counting the number of articles on cases of corruption, involving or not politicians, produced by two important Italian nationwide newspapers, La Repubblica and Il Giornale, that are also characterized by a clear ideological orientation.
On the one hand, La Repubblica was founded in 1976 and since its origins it has chosen to place itself within the Italian secular and reformist left 4 ; since 1987 it has been one of the most read Italian newspaper at national level. 5 On the other hand, Il Giornale was created in 1974, with a more centrist attitude than La Repubblica, but as soon as its new owner, Mr. Silvio Berlusconi 6 , decided to enter into politics in 1994 it started assuming political positions definitively closer to the Italian right-wing parties, Mr. Berlusconi being the leader of right-wing parties during the last 20 years. In terms of the size of its 4 The name of the newspaper is a tribute to a small Portuguese newspaper (República), controlled by its own workers, which provided influential information during the "Carnation" revolution in Portugal in 1974. 5 It has alternated the first place with Il Corriere della Sera. 6 Actually, he became the greatest shareholder of the company controlling Il Giornale (Societá Europea di Edizioni S.p.A.) in 1979, but up to his decision to enter into politics, which occurred in 1994, he had never openly interfered with the editorial line of the newspaper, which was always consistent with its original centrism.
readership, although it is the biggest among the national right-wing leaning newspapers, it is dramatically smaller than for La Repubblica, accounting on average for less than half of the size of the readership of this newspaper. 7 The articles are selected from the Factiva archive by applying a specific searching procedure by sensitive keywords, which is described in details in the Appendix A. The Factiva archive is a commercial database containing the production of several national and international media outlets, among which also the two Italian newspapers considered in our analysis, La Repubblica produces in general more articles about corruption scandals than Il Giornale, regardless of the political orientation of the people involved, and despite the shorter observational window within the Factiva archive for the former than for the latter. Such differences could be due to a general stronger attention this newspaper pays to corruption, but also to the higher number of pages making La Repubblica 8 , allowing for a higher number of articles published in the same issue. Indeed, by looking at the total distribution of the number of articles for each observation, it is easy to see that the differences between the two newspapers are dramatically reduced, with La Repubblica publishing on average 
Empirical strategy
The aim of this work is to assess whether there exists an 'electoral cycle bias' in the coverage of news with high political value by newspapers and how this interacts with the ideological stance of the papers. The choice to focus on news about corruption scandals related to the NHS in the Italian regions is motivated by the fact that these news are very important for the readers' to assess the performance of politicians and political parties at the local level, and we expect their coverage to be influenced by demand-and supply-side variables along the electoral cycle. Indeed, from the reader's point of view, as the elections approach, the value she attaches to news about corruption scandals increases, as knowing about misuses of public resources might help to cast her vote knowingly at the elections. 9 This implies that also the coverage of corruption scandals by the media will possibly increase following the increase in the demand for this kind of news. Moreover, just given the potentially strong effects they might have on the voters' preferences, whether an electoral cycle in their coverage does exist, then there would be a clear incentive for the media to slant it according to their own ideology, trying to affect the electoral results. In particular,
if an 'electoral cycle bias' does exist, we should observe that the two newspapers cover more corruption scandals as the election approaches (demand-side effect), emphasizing those scandals involving the political party opposite to the their own ideology, and leaving unaltered, or even reducing, the coverage of those involving politicians closer to their ideology, or with any political connection (supply-side effect).
In order to test for the presence of this 'electoral cycle bias', we estimate the following Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model:
where the dependent variable Articles c ijt is defined -according to Puglisi The set of controls X includes variables varying at different lags of time, some possibly with monthly variation, while some others by year. The complete list of controls is in Appendix B, together with a brief description and the source of data. Starting from the first group, it is reasonable to assume that the higher is the number of corruption cases already detected, the higher will be the probability that a newspaper will publish news about them. Thus, we control for both the total number of corruption scandals already discovered up to date t in region j and the number of new ones discovered at date t 10 , and these controls are defined separately for each political orientation of the scandal c. To take into account how the coverage of corruption scandals by newspaper i at date t is affected by the general coverage of this type of news within the Italian market of newspapers, we control for the number of articles about episodes of corruption in region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at the date t 11 , which is also calculated separately for each political orientation of the scandal c. In addition, among the first group of controls there are also three variables accounting for the possible heterogeneity in the coverage of corruption scandals linked to the Italian political framework both at regional and national level at date t, and possibly interacting with the newspaper i 's ideology. Specifically, we include a dummy indicating if the incumbent governor of region j at date t belongs to the right-wing party, the number of consecutive terms she has been elected and a dummy signaling if the incumbent prime minister at date t belongs to the right-wing party.
As for the group of controls varying only by year, it includes variables possibly affecting both the propensity of the two newspapers to cover news about corruption scandals related to the NHS in the Italian regions and the possibility that new episodes of corruption are discovered, which could eventually lead to more articles. As covering, or even discovering, a corruption scandal might be costly, we add the newspapers' turnover in the year y-1 as a control for their financial resources since we assume that higher resources could lead in general to higher coverage. 12 In order to account for the newspaper'i 's specific interest in the public affairs of the region j, which might ultimately affect its propensity to report corruption stories, we use the ratio between the newspaper i 's diffusion within the region j and its national diffusion both at the year y-1. 13 Given the number of articles produced at the date t by newspaper i about corruption scandals in the region j being intrinsically connected with both the possibility that new cases arise, and are discovered by the judicial authority, we employ two dummies to control for these sources of heterogeneity. One indicates whether the public health expenditure per capita in region j is above the national average in the year y, assuming that where there is more money there is also more room for corruption, and the other dummy takes value 1 if the regional public expenditure in security in region j is above the national average in the year y, as more resources for investigating on corruption are likely to lead to discover more episodes.
Results
The estimates of Equation 1 are presented in Table 2 . For each political orientations of corruption scandals we run two different specifications, one without any control, and one including all of them. Given the use of interaction terms in our regressions, in order to make easier the general interpretation of the results we calculate in Table 3 Starting the analysis from the articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians, and considering the complete specification of Equation 1 (column (2) of Table 2 ), Il Giornale produces in general 0.21 articles more in the 14 days before the election than in other periods, corresponding to 1.70 daily articles against 1.50 (column (1) of Table   3 ). Although such difference is only weakly significant (at 10%), it accounts for 38% of Il Giornale's standard deviation in the number of articles produced per observation about might be influenced by the coverage of corruption scandals.
left episodes of corruption (first column of the bottom part of Table 1 ). Concerning La Repubblica, it does not show any significant difference in its coverage of this kind of news with respect to Il Giornale neither during electoral times, nor in other periods, even if it does actually produce less articles about left episodes both in no electoral periods (1.07 against 1.50 produced by Il Giornale) and within 14 days from the election (1.29 against 1.70 produced by Il Giornale). Indeed, although also La Repubblica seems to experience an increase in the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption when elections are approaching (around 0.22, from 1.07 to 1.29), this difference is not statistically different from zero. In addition, as also Il Giornale increases the number of articles about left episodes of corruption in electoral times by almost the same degree, the general difference between the two newspapers does not vary when elections are approaching but remains almost stable as the coefficient for Rep×Election shows (column (2) of Table 2 ).
As for the articles about corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians (column (4) of Table 2 , and column (2) of Table 3 ), Il Giornale reduces in a significant way during election times the daily number of these articles of about 0.36 pieces, from an already low mean in no electoral periods (0.42 and not significantly different from zero), representing 55% of the standard deviation in the number of articles about right episodes of corruption per observation for this newspaper (second column of the bottom part of Table 1 ). Like for the left episodes of corruption, also for the right ones the difference between the number of daily articles produced by La Repubblica and Il Giornale is not statistically different from zero, neither in no electoral periods, nor within 14 days from the elections, even if its size is definitively greater than for the left episodes, as showed in column (4) of Table 2 (1.04 articles within no electoral periods and 1.45 articles during electoral times). Moreover also in this case the differences between the number of articles produced by La Repubblica within 14 days before the elections is not statistically different from the same number in the other periods, being the former just slightly bigger than the latter (1.51 against 1.46 in no electoral times). Differently from the previous case, now the difference in how the daily number of articles varies between the two newspapers as the election is approaching is positive and strongly significant: as the election gets closer, the difference in the daily number of articles about right episodes of corruption between La Repubblica and Il Giornale significantly changes by increasing of about 0.41 articles (from 1.04 to 1.45). In particular, such increase is mainly driven by the reduction in the number of articles by Il Giornale rather than to an increase in the coverage of this type of news by La Repubblica, that we found to be very small (1.46 against 1.51).
Finally, with respect to corruption scandals not involving politicians, also in this case Il Giornale reduces its daily coverage by about 1 article as the election gets closer (column (6) of Table 2 ), moving from 1.62 articles before the electoral period to 0.63 in the electoral times. The impact is statistically significant, stronger than for the right episodes, corresponding to 150% of the standard deviation in the daily number of articles about no political episodes of corruption for this newspaper (column (3) of the bottom part of Table   1 ). As for the other types of corruption scandals, also with respect to those not involving politicians, La Repubblica does not show significant differences in the daily number of articles about these scandals with respect to Il Giornale, neither in no electoral periods (0.52 articles less than Il Giornale), nor in electoral times (0.66 articles more than Il Giornale). 
Robustness checks
In this section we check the robustness of our results with respect to a different specification of the regression model, to the potential endogeneity of some rounds of elections, and to different definitions of the time frame before the next electoral round. The results of this test are presented in Table 4 , where reported coefficients represents Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR), while the marginal effects on the number of articles per observation is provided in Table 5 . 14 Both the estimates and the expected number of articles per observation are very much Repubblica increases significantly in election times its difference in the number of articles about right and non political episodes of corruption with respect to Il Giornale (of about 20% and 123% respectively), but again the difference with its own production in no electoral periods is not significant, signaling the absence of an electoral cycle bias for this newspaper.
A different specification
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A different sample
The discovery of a corruption scandal, and its extensive coverage by newspapers, could lead the incumbent regional governor to resign; eventually, this will imply an anticipation of the electoral round with respect to its normal schedule. Such reverse effect of the coverage of the scandals by newspapers on the electoral cycle might induce endogeneity in our estimates. In particular, we could end up with some observations (i.e., those between the date of the last electoral round and the date of the governor's resignation) whose distance from the election does not reflect the normal conclusion of a legislation, being anticipated exactly because of the corruption scandal. According to Italian legislation, which requires call for new elections to take several months, the very short time frame we consider should In order to test the robustness of our results with respect to this issue we re-run Equation
1
, excluding from the sample all the observations for these two regions, recorded between the pairs of dates described above. These new estimates are presented in Table 6 while the marginal effects are showed in Table 7 . Results are largely confirmed, both in terms of magnitude and significance. The only difference concerns the variation in the coverage by Il Giornale of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians within 14 days from the election which is still negative but no longer significant. This result is hardly surprising and shows the importance of the case involving the right wing politician Roberto Formigoni for Il Giornale. Differently from other governors, Mr. Formigoni is a key figure also in the national politics (he has recently been a member of the Italian Senate) and shared significant linkages with Mr. Berlusconi.
Different definitions of the distance from elections
We finally test the robustness of our results with respect to the definition of the time interval to elections. Specifically, instead of considering the 14 days frame, we use as alternative time intervals 0-7 days (1 week), 0-28 days (4 weeks), 0-42 days (6 weeks) and 0-56 days (8 weeks).
The results of this test are showed in Table 8 and 9. The use of different time periods for defining the dummy Election does not affect our main results, since also these new estimates are very similar in sign, magnitude and significance to those showed in Table 2 .
Moreover, looking at the size of the coefficients, they are decreasing in the length of the interval considered 15 , a result which brings further support to the existence of an 'electoral cycle bias' in the coverage of news about corruption scandals.
Conclusions
It is hardly surprising that, in a democracy, politicians have strong incentives to use policy tools to influence voters' preferences when elections get near. But an issue that the political budget cycle literature as only marginally discussed is the role of media in this strategy, which is driven by both users' preferences and the ideological stance of the media. The literature on the political economy of mass media has discussed so far a number of dimensions on which media can operate an ideological selection: the issue to be covered, the specific aspects of the issue to highlight or exclude, how facts are presented and discussed and which sources to rely on. In this work we add to the literature by investigating the existence of an ideological bias in the coverage of news about corruption induced by the electoral cycle. Our empirical analysis is based on an original database containing all the articles produced by two of the most important Italian newspapers which are also charac- 15 The absence of news from Il Giornale about right episodes of corruption within 7 days from the elections (which does not allow us to estimate the coefficient for Rep×Election) might be interpreted as an evidence in favor of the stronger effect of the electoral cycle on Il Giornale's coverage of right episodes of corruption as the distance from the elections comes closer. The "electoral cycle bias" is so strong that this newspaper prefer to avoid completely to publish articles about this kind of scandals as the elections are very close in order to minimize possible negative effects on the right-wing politicians running for the election. 
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(1) (1) and (2)), right-wing politicians (columns (3) and (4)) or any political party (columns (5) and (6)). All the estimates are obtained through the Least Square Dummy Variable regression model presented in Equation 1 . Column (2) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Column (4) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about right episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t.
Column (6) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals with any political connection already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) also control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the right-wing party, for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the incumbent prime minister at the date t belongs to the right-wing party, for the newspapers' turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between the newspapers' diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public health expenditure per capita in region j at the year y is above the national average and if the public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is above the national average. Moreover they all contain dummies to account for region-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects and year-fixed effects. The bottom part of the table reports the R 2 of each specification. All the standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper for each region. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Left episodes Right episodes NP episodes Table 3 : Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption scandals.
Note: The upper part of the table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)) or right-wing politicians (columns (2)). All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 2 , and in particular to the most completed specifications (columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 ). The bottom part of the table provides the differences in the number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale in no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two newspapers as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (2) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about right episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Column (3) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals with any political connection already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Columns (1), (2) and (3) also control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the right-wing party, for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the incumbent prime minister at the date t belongs to the right-wing party, for the newspapers'
turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between the newspapers' diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public health expenditure per capita in region j at the year y is above the national average and if the public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is above the national average. Moreover, they all contain dummies to account for region-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects. We use as exposure vari- Table 5 : Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption scandals -Negative Binomial.
Note: The table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)), right-wing politicians (columns (2)) or any political party (columns (3)). All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 4 . The bottom part of the table provides the differences in the number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale in no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two newspapers as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (2) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about right episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Column (3) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals with any political connection already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. All the columns also control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the rightwing party, for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the incumbent prime minister at the date t belongs to the right-wing party, for the newspapers' turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between the newspapers' diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public health expenditure per capita in region j at the year y is above the national average and if the public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is above the national average. Moreover they all contain dummies to account for region-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects.
The bottom part of the table reports the R 2 of each specification. All the standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper for each region. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
(1) Table 7 : Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption scandals -different estimation sample.
Note: The table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)), right-wing politicians (columns (2)) or any political party (columns (3)). All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 6 . The bottom part of the table provides the differences in the number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale in no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two newspapers as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Dependent variables: Daily number of articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1), (4), (7) and (10)), right-wing politicians (columns (2), (5), (8) and (11)) or any political party (columns (3), (6), (9) and (12) . All the estimates are obtained through the Least Square Dummy Variable regression model presented in Equation 1, using as time distance for defining the dummy Electionj t for the closeness to the electoral round 0-7 days (columns (1)-(3) ), 0-28 days (columns (4)-(6)), 0-42 days (columns (7)- (9))and 0-56 (columns (10)- (12)) from the elections. Columns (1), (4), (7) and (10) control for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Columns (2), (5), (8) and (11) control for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about right episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Columns (3), (6) , (9) and (12) control for the cumulative number of corruption scandals with any political connection already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. All the columns also control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the right-wing party, for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the incumbent prime minister at the date t belongs to the right-wing party, for the newspapers' turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between the newspapers' diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public health expenditure per capita in region j at the year y is above the national average and if the public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is above the national average. Moreover they all contain dummies to account for region-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects. In column (2) the coefficient for RepXElection is missing since the absence within our estimation sample of observations from Il Giornale about right episodes of corruption within 7 days from the elections did not allow to estimate such coefficient. The bottom part of the table reports the R 2 of each specification. All the standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper for each region. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Table 9 : Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption scandals -different definitions of the distance from the election.
Note: The table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1), (4), (7) and (10)), right-wing politicians (columns (2), (5), (8) and (11)) or any political party (columns (3), (6), (9) and (12)). In column (2) the marginal effect for Il Giornale and Il GiornaleXElection are missing since the absence within our estimation sample of observations for Il Giornale about right episodes of corruption within 7 days from the elections did not allow to estimate such coefficients. All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 8 . The bottom part of the table provides the differences in the number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale in no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two newspapers as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
• NewEpisodes c jt : The number of cases of corruption in the NHS with political orientation c (left episodes, right episodes, no political episodes) in the region j discovered at the date t (day/month/year). We consider as discovered at the date t all those corruption scandals which appear for the first time at the date t in our sample of articles derived from the Factiva database (including also Il Corriere della Sera).
• Corriere • RGovernor jt : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent governor of region j at the date t (day/month/year) belongs to the Italian right-wing party and 0 otherwise. • Mandates jt : The number of consecutive mandates run by the incumbent governor of the Italian region j at the date t (day/month/year). For constructing this variable we matched the information about the dates of the articles derived from the Factiva database with the information concerning regional elections in each Italian region, as provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs through its official web page.
• RPrime t : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent Italian Prime Minister at the date t (day/month/year) belongs to the Italian right-wing part and 0 otherwise. • Turnover i(y−1 ) : The total turnover of newspaper i (La Repubblica or Il Giornale) in the year y-1 expressed in logarithmic scale. We derive the information for constructing this variable from the report "La Stampa in Italia" produced yearly by Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali (FIEG). The raw information is available for all the years in the interval 2002-2012. We impute the value for 2013 and 2014 using the average between the values recorded during the five years before.
• Diffusion ij (y−1 ) : The ratio between the newspaper i 's number of copies sold in region j and the total number of copies sold over the entire Italian territory in the year y-1. We derive the information for constructing this variable directly from the web page of the Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa (ADS), which provides such information for all the years within the interval 2002-2014.
• HealthExpXCapita jy : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the the public health expenditure per capita in region j is above the national average in the year y and 0 otherwise. The information for constructing the variable is directly derived for all the years within the interval 2002-2014 from the database "Health for All " produced by the ISTAT.
• SecExpXCapita jy : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the the public expenditure for law and order per capita in region j is above the national average in the year y and 
